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Case No.

12647

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

In order to simplify the consideration of the Appellants' discussion of the points raised in the Respondents' Brief, the points will be discussed by the Appellant
in the order in which they are set out in that brief, as far
as practical.
1

POINT I
REPLY TO RESPONEN'l'S STATEMENT OF
FACTS.
With the respect to the Respondents' statement of
facts, the principle issue with this statement taken by the
Appellants' is that in this purpored statement of facts,
under the guise of foundational facts, the Appellants'
have simply set out matters which they would like to
have the Court consider as evidence in support of their
claim that paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree is
ambiguous. There is nothing in the record to support
their statement that the matters set forth by them as
foundational facts were the bases of the Summary Judgment entered by the trial Court in the present case, nor
that any of the matters referred to were any more than
part of the mass of evidence which was before the Court
in its consideration of Civil No. 2888 in which the Provo
River Decree was originally entered.
At this point it would probably be appropriate to
reiterate the Appellants' contention in its original brief
that there is no ambiguity in paragraph 4 ( c) of the
Provo River Decree, but that it is a clear and concise
award of 16.5 second feet of water to Provo City for
both irrigation and power uses, and that for this reason
the matters referred to as foundational facts in Respondents' Brief are immaterial in the present action and
should not be considered by the Court, as is the case with
most of the points set out in Respondents' Brief. However, in the event the Court may feel that some ambiguity
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exists in paragraph 4 ( c), the Appellants will proceed to
answer the various points presented, without prejudice
to the Appellants' contention that they should not properly be considered by the Court.
In this brief the Appellant will follow the nomenclature suggested by the Respondents in their first paragraph on page three of their brief.
Calling attention to the statements made in the
second paragraph of Defendants' brief on page 3, it
should be pointed out that the documents referred to
therein were nothing more than a proposed method of
distribution for the one year, 1917, during the pendency
of the proceedings in Civil No. 2888, and should in no
way be considered as anything in a nature of a final determination by anyone of the rights ultimately awarded
to the various parties. However, contrary to the Defendants' contention that this outline of distribution for
the 1917 indicates that Provo City should receive no irrigation rights under the factory race water, the outline in
fact does just the opposite, in that it concedes to Provo
City a total of 63.17 second feet of water without any
restrictions on it whatever. It is also significant that in
this outline no mention is made of any of the water to be
used for power purposes such as Utah Power and Light
Company and Provo Pressed Brick Water nor for any
other non-consumptive use. From this it would appear
that the clear inference of the outline was that the factory race water was of the same class as all of the rest of
the water mentioned in the outline, which was clearly
irrigation water.

Further, with respect to the second paragraph of
page 3 of the Defendants' brief, referring to the outline
of the proposed distribution of water to Provo City for
the year 1917 of the factory race, instead of showing, as
the Defendants try to imply, that said documents state
"with no irrigation thereunder" it would appear that the
documents do just the opposite, in that the factory race
water was listed with a list of water uses which are all
consumptive uses, and the total 288.40 second feet mentioned in that outline was the water available in the river
for consumptive use.
The Defendants refer to the "Decision" of C. W.
Morris in an attempt to show that this was power use
water only, inasmuch as it refers to the water "for power
purposes." It should be pointed out that this was apparently a preliminary decision submitted by the Court in
a most informal matter, three and a half years prior to
the entry of the final decree, and was not accepted by
Provo City with respect to the water available to it
through its water works system nor with respect to the
water in the factory race. The Defendants own exhibits,
as well as the Plaintiffs' copies of the testimony and stipulation, ( R. 170, 178, 179, and 182) establish the existence of this controversy, which was settled, changed, and
clarified by the entry of the final decree in 1921. These
documents show without question that the factory race
water, particularly, was the subject of argument, additional testimony, and stipulation between the 1917 preliminary decision and the entry of the 1921 final decree.
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Again the Defendants make unwarranted inferences by stating in the first complete paragraph on page
4 of their brief that the stipulation specifically identified
the water as the power right water, whereas the stipulation specifically states: "second, that the Court shall find
and decree to Provo City 16.5 second feet constant flow
of the waters of Provo River, flowing in and through the
factory race." (R. 101, 102, 178, and 179) and no mention is made of "the power right water." They also try to
support their position by a statement of Jacob Evans in
a discussion among Atorneys, in which he referred to the
water as "the power right water." (R. 103) This statement by Jacob Evans should be given no weight to support the contention that this water was awarded exclusively for the generation of power. He was not Provo
City's Attorney, and in any event the statement was
simply a quick identification of the stream to which they
were referring. It will be noted in the discourse concerning this water (R. 101, 102, and 103) that at no place is
there any inference of any restriction on the Plaintiff's
ownership of this water nor the nature of its use. This
discourse also indicated clearly that the 16.50 second feet
of water was all of the water which was taken from
Provo River for use in the factory race.
In interpreting the significance of this, it should be
borne in mind that all of the water of the factory race
was used for irrigation. (R. 169, 170, 171, 175, 176, 177,
184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 180, 181, 182, and 183) So it follows that all of the 16.50 second feet of water which is in
dispute in the present action was used for irrigation as

5

well as for the generation of power, exactly as is stated in
both the Findings and the Decree.
With respect to the second paragraph on page 4 of
the Defendants brief the whole proceedings indicate that
there was a material dispute with the respect to the
amount of water which had been used by Provo City
through the factory race, and indications are that attempts were made to prove the amounts of water which
had been used in this race by proving the minimum
amount which would be required to turn certain wheels.
This would, in fact, be a fairly effective and reasonable
way to support Provo City's contention concerning the
amount of water flowing in that particular stream. It
appears that the factory race was the only stream which
was used during the irrigation season for both power and
irrigation, and this preoccupation with the power uses in
the stream and their significance with respect to the
volume of its flow, would lend itself to unprecise statements by the parties with respect to the power and irrigation uses in the factory race and to the identification
of this particular stream as the "power water." This
would particularly be the case if it were assumed by
everyone and firmly fixed in their minds that whatever
water was used for power purposes in this stream was
also used for irrigation. This point was obviously picked
up by Provo City's Attorneys between 1917 and 1921,
because in the 1921 Findings and Decree this particular
water is never referred to without explicit statements to
the effect that it had been used for irrigation purposes as
well as the genera ti on of power. ( R. 160 and 165)
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In the third paragraph on page 4 of the Defendants'
brief a statement is made that Wentz, the Provo River
Water Commissioner, differentiated between the water
delivered for irrigation purposes and the water delivered
to the factory race for power purposes. Defendants are
apparently referring to his answer in about the center of
page 4348 (R. 110 A) in which he states "Irrigation
purposes and the factory race for power purposes." He
had apparently been testifying about the water he had
delivered during the year under a tentative decree, and
in answer to the question, "for irrigation purposes?", he
answered, "irrigation purposes and the factory race for
power purposes." This answer was obviously not made
for the purpose of eliminating irrigation use from the
factory race, but simply to add "power purposes" to
those of irrigation. To the previous question Mr. Wentz
had indicated that whatever total he was talking about
was a total by actual quantity measured to all the users
under the tentative decree. His answer to the subsequent
questions concerning the portion which had been measured for irrigation, in which he stated that "all of it except the waters to the factory race" is explained by the
fact that the factory race water had been treated as a
unit of its own and was a fixed pre-determined amount,
used for both irrigation and power, which made it unnecessary for him to keep a separate measurement in
order to determine how much had been required by the
various irrigation users in the other City canals since
entry of the tentative decree. This amount was probably
determined by the stipulation of the Plaintiff and Provo
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City entered into in 1918 at pages 5159 and 5164 volume
9 of the proceedings. (R. 101, 102, 178, and 179}
With reference to the statement made by the Defendants in the first full paragraph on page 5 of their
brief, it is obvious that the rights granted under 58 ( c)
of the Findings of Fact and 4 ( c) of the Decree were
separate from and in addition to the rights granted under
58 (a) and 58 ( b) of the Findings and 4 (a) and 4 ( b) of
the Decree, and the State Engineer so determined in his
directive of May 1, 1970 to the Provo River Water Commissioner, as did the District Court in paragraph 3 of its
Summary Judgment in the present action. It was necessary to give it different treatment in this manner because
it was the only water which during the irrigation season
of the year was used for both irrigation and power purposes by the same owner. The fact that it was used for
both of these purposes cannot be refuted because it is
clearly stated in paragraph 58 ( c) of the Findings (R.
165) as follows: "which water has heretofore been used
for irrigation purposes by said City and for the generation of power by the Provo Ice and Cold Storage Company, a corporation," etc. This is followed up by the
statement in paragraph 4 ( c) of the Decree ( R. 160) as
follows: "which water has heretofore been used for irrigation purposes by said City and for the generation of
power by Provo Ice and Cold Storage Company, a corporation," etc. No matter what testimony or other proceedings had gone before, the fact remains that the
Court found that the 16.5 second feet of water in question had theretofore been used for irrigation purposes.
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This coupled with the fact that this finding was reflected
in the Decree could leave no doubt as to its previous use.
In view of the fact that the Court, in the Provo River
Case based its awards on the various rights which had
previously been established to the Provo River Waters,
as pointed out on pages 12 and 13 of Appellants original
brief, it followed without question that Provo City was
entitled to be awarded its previously acquired use for
irrigation purposes. Thus the only reason for incorporating in 4 ( c) the statement "which water had heretofore
been used for irrigation purposes," etc. would be to make
sure that there was no question but that Provo City had
the right to use this water for that purpose, because that
was one of the uses under which it had been initiated,
acquired, and used down through the years.
Commenting on the Defendants' reference to the
manner of assessment of the water in the factory race, as
set out in the second paragraph of their brief on page 5,
Provo City points out that this is the only equitable way
in which a reliable, and constant assessment could be
made against this water, because there was no fixed
acreage of land irrigated by this water to which any other
basis of assessment could be applied, and no duty had
been assigned to it. Both of these requirements were necessary to apply the formula set out in the first paragraph
of section 169 on page 92 of the Findings. (R. 114)
In view of the fact that the factory race water was
the only water which was used for both irrigation and
power purposes by the same owner, a special formula had
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to be worked out for its assessment, and this formula had
to avoid any double assessment, such as would have resulted if an attempt had been made to make an assessment for power purposes and also for irrigation purposes. Such a double assessment would not be justified,
because the distribution of this water from the Provo
River for its dual uses would not be any more expensive
than it would have been for an irrigation use alone.
The multiple of 165 used to calculate the assessment
against this water was the same as the multiple used for
the assessment for the Class A Water Rights in the first
paragraph of 196, (R. 114) thus the assessment against
the 16.5 second feet of water would be the same as if it
were used exclusively for irrigation. It is significant to
note that the factory race water is the only water subject
to a power use to which this irrigation type assessment
formula was applied. All others were assessed a fixed
amount in dollars per month, set out in the second paragraph of section 169 of the Findings of Fact. (R. 114).

POINT II
On pages 7 and 8 of their brief, the Defendants contend that statements under Point III of Provo City's
brief are contrary to the position taken by Provo City in
the trial Court. This is not correct. In the trial Court, as
well as before the present Court, Provo City took the
position that no ambiguity existed in paragraph 4 ( c) of
the Provo River Decree. However, recognizing the fact
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that the Court might not agree with Provo City's contention and might not be satisfied with the City's interpretation of paragraph 4 ( c) even after reference to the
.Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the City
called the Court's attention to documents and testimony
in Civil No. 2888 which supported Provo City's interpretation. This position was at that time, and still is, entirely consistent with the laws of the State of Utah and
with decisions previously rendered by the Utah Supreme
Court. In Salt Lake City vs. Salt Lake City Water and
Electrical Power Company, 54 U 10, 17 4 P 1134
( 1918) the Court at page 1136 stated as follows:
Counsel for the Applicant have, however, at great
length, set forth in their brief and arguments the
entire history of the litigation, and all of the circumstances and conditions which, they contend,
have a bearing upon the equities of the case and
the justice of their contention. Where the meaning of the language of a statute, writing, or document is obscure, ambiguous, or uncertain, it is always proper to have recourse to the surrounding
circumstances and conditions for the purpose of
determining the meaning of the language, and in
that way arrive at the intention of those who used
the language to express their purpose. Where,
however, as here, the language of the Decree by
which all parties thereto are bound is free from
ambiguity and doubt, then the rule is elementary
that extraneous circumstances and conditions
may not be resorted to if to do that makes the
meaning of the language uncertain or ambiguous.
E.xtraneous matters may be invoked to clear up
uncertainty and doubts, but not to create them.
(Italics ours.)
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Proceeding further on Page 1137 the Court states:
There is no reason whatever why the natural, obvious, and ordinary meaning of the language used
in the Decree should not be followed. If, under
such circumstances, the ordinary meaning of the
language used is departed from, there is really no
limit to which a Court could not go. The exigencies of the particular case would perhaps suggest
a limit, but even that could not prove a deterrent
in all cases. The only safe and rational rule, there£ore, is to abide by the natural and ordinary meaning of the language used, and such rule we feel in
duty bound to follow in this as in all other cases.
In response to an Application for re-hearing in this same
case the Court in the last paragraph on page 1137 makes
the following statement:
How is the meaning and effect of the author's
language to be ascertained? There is but one way,
and that is by considering the language in the
light of the subject-matter and giving the words
their usual and ordinary meaning and effect. If.
after doing that, the meaning of the language is
clear, then the intention must also be clear, and
there is no further room for construction. There
is nothing to construe when the meaning of the
language is acertained.
In the foregoing case the legal situation which existed
was, for all practical purposes, the same as that which
existed in the present case. While the fact situation
was not the same in both cases, the legal issues and the
legal principles with respect to the interpretation of the
Court's Decree and the circumstances under which consideration may be given to matters outside of the De-
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cree, are the same, except that in the case cited above
the Supreme Court apparently had before it the entire
record, while in the present case it has before it only
those portions of the record in Civil No. 2888 which
the parties to the present action felt might favor his
case, in the light of the various positions the District
Court might take in considering the Decree, Findings
of Fact, and Conclusions of Law in the Provo River
Case, Civil No. 2888.
The law seems well established that if the Court
feels that the Decree is not ambiguous there is no justification for resorting to any other material. If the Court
feels that any ambiguity exists, it should then resort
to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law supporting the Decree, and if this clarifies the Decree there
should be no resort to anything further. If, on the other
hand, the Court feels that even after resort to the Decree,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, some ambiguity still exists, it can then resort to the entire record.
( 46 Am J ur 2d p. 365 Section 76)
It is still Provo City's contention in the present
case that paragraph 4 ( c) of the Provo River Decree
is clear and unambiguous and recognizes the previous
use by Provo City of the water in question for irrigation
purposes as well as for the generation of power, and
therefore awards the 16.5 second feet of water to Provo
City for both of those purposes. However, recognizing
that Courts do not always agree with what seems clear
to one party in the case, the City presented documentation to support its position, in the event the Court
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might wish to inquire beyond the Findings and Decrees.
This, however, did not at any time, and does not now,
in any way amount to an abandonment of the City's
contention that the Decree is clear and unambiguous
and that no further material should be resorted to for
the interpretation.
At the beginning of the last paragraph on page 8
of their brief, the Defendants state that the Trial Court
said that 4 ( c) is ambiguous, and refer to (TR IO),
which is part of the transcript of the conversation in
the District Court between the Judge and Attorneys for
the respective parties. They are undoubtedly referring
to the statement in the transcript which appears as follows:
THE COURT: There is an ambiguity in paragraph 4 (c).
This was simply a clarifying remark of the Court
at the pre-trial conference. It was certainly no statement
of opinion by the Judge. The statement was made by
him simply to clarify the previous statement by Mr.
Clyde wherein he had said:
I think we would first have to determine if there
is any ambiguity.
It will be noted that Mr. Clyde did not specify what
ambiguity he was referring to. When the Judge made
this statement he was simply making it clear that Mr.
Clyde was referring to an ambiguity in paragraph 4 ( c) ·
His meaning was the same as if he had made the statement in the following manner: When you state that we
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would first have to determine if there is any ambiguity,
I assume that you are ref erring to paragraph 4 ( c).
In answer to the statements made by the Defendants
in the last paragraph of page 8 and the first full paragraph of page 9 of their brief, Provo City will first
refer the Court to the statements starting with the third
paragraph on page 11 of Provo City's original brief
and continuing through to paragraph 'b" on page 12.
In addition, Provo City calls the Court's attention to
the statements of the Court in paragraph 43 of the Findings of Fact in Civil No. 2888 ( R 191) to the following
effect:
That as to quantities of water to which the parties
plaintiff and defendants are entitled, as hereinafter found by the Court, the water used upon the
lands of the plaintiff and defendants for irrigation, the water used by the defendants for the generation of power; and the water used by the defendants for municipal and domestic purposes
have been used for beneficial purposes, and are
necessary and that the said uses have been necessary and beneficial from year to year ever since
the same was first diverted and appropriated.
(Italics ours.)
and to paragraph 45 of the same Findings of Fact
(R. 192} in which the Court includes the following
statement:
That the plaintiff's grantors and predecessors in
interest, and the defendants and their grantors
and predecessors in interests, many years ago,
when the waters of said river was unappropriated
entered upon the said river and constructed da.ms
therein and canals and waterways extendmg
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therefrom to their lands, Cities, power plants, and
places of use of the said waters, and then and
there diverted from the said river and its tributaries the waters thereof, and conveyed the same
through their canals and waterways to the places
of use thereof and ever since have continued to so
divert and use the said waters in the amounts, proportions and for the purposes hereinafter more
particularly stated, and during all of the said
time, the parties hereto, their grantors and predecessors in interests have continued to be and the
parties hereto are now entitled to the use of the
waters of said river at the places and to the extent
and for the purposes hereinafter stated.
In view of these Findings by the Court and the
fact that the Court in the Provo River Decree was
simply making a determination of the rights which had
been previously acquired by the various parties, the
Court's statement in 4 ( c) to the effect that the 16.50
second feet of water had theretofore been used for
irrigation purposes by the City, as well as for the generation of power, etc., constitutes a clear award for that
purpose, particularly where the right is restricted to
the irrigation season of each year, as was done in the
first sentence of paragraph 4 ( c) .
In their last paragraph on page 9, continuing over
on to page 10 of their brief, the Defendants indicate
that they feel there is some point to be made of the
fact that an acre duty would have been specified if
the water had been intended for irrigation. The mere
fact that this was done in paragraph 4 (a) and 4 (b)
does not indicate that there is anything wrong with not
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ascribing an acre duty to the water referred to in 4 ( c) .
This was an entirely different type of award than was
the case with respect to the water in 4 (a) and 4 ( b).
The water in 4 ( c) was the only water in the entire
decree which was awarded for the dual use of both
irrigation and power by the same owner. Furthermore,
the water in 4 ( c) was a fixed amount, without any variation throughout the whole irrigation season, which was
necessary because of its dual use for power as well as
irrigation.
The Defendants in attempting to make some point
of the fact that no duty was ascribed to this water,
and that if it had been intended to be used for irrigation,
a duty would have been ascribed to it along with the
number of acres to be irrigated, go so far as to state
that this was done under all of the other class A irrigation rights except with John D. Dixon and John C.
Whiting. This position cannot be supported. In the
first place the entire decree in Civil No. 2888 is not
before the Court and it cannot therefore be determined
how many class A rights have been awarded for irrigation purposes without any acreage or duty being
affixed thereto. In fact there were several class A
irrigation awards of this kind. Some of them appear
on pages 25, 26, and 27 of the decree, which are before
the Court at this time. ( R 193, 194, and 195)
It must be kept in mind that once acquired, irrigation water could be owned and could be transferred
without any attachment to or relationship to any particular land; as had been done in the case of the John
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D. Dixon water right cited by the Defendants. (R. 194)
This 16.50 second feet of water was obviously water
in which the irrigation rights had been acquired by
use on lands which were in addition to the 2,558 acres
of land ref erred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 ( b) , because both the State Engineer and the Court here found
and decreed that it was not the same water as that
which was associated with this land. The awards in
4 (a) and 4 ( b) were likely for specific areas of the City,
for they total only 2,558 acres, probably far less than
the area of the City at that time, and certainly less than
the present total area of the City, which is approximately 13,190 acres; a matter of which the Court should
take judicial notice. It is not the responsibility of the
City at this time to show in what manner this water
was acquired, nor is it the prerogative of any party
to require such a showing by the City. Having once
acquired the water, Provo City would be subject to
no limitation upon where it could use the water for
irrigation purposes, nor the amount which it would be
required to use upon any particular land. This being
the case, it would be impossible for the Court to assign
such water any duty whatever.
In connection with this, it would probably be well
to keep in mind the Judge's statement in Civil No. 2888,
set out below, to the effect that he was not concerned
with what Provo City was now using, but with what
it had previously used and now owned.
The principle question that the Court wants to be
determined is what water rights the City owns.
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My view is, I will say gentlemen, that the city is
not only-has the right to make some provisions
for future uses, but it is the duty of the city to do
that. If they have an ownership of the water and
acquire a right to it, why it is not of as much importance to show they have a present necessity
for it as it is the ordinary user of water because
the court takes judicial notice and it is well settiled by the cases, as I remember, that it is the
duty of the city to make provision for the future
to some extent, so that this matter of just what
their present necessities are I don't think is of as
much importance as it is for you to establish what
water you own. That is the view I have of it, that
your water rights, how you acquired them and
whether you have them is more important than
just the question than whether you have a present
necessity every month in a year for the full quantity of water that you have the right to use. (R.
189, 190)

Also significant in arriving at an understanding of
Provo's unique position in the Provo River lawsuit,
was the Judge's statement to the effect that it was not
only the right of the City, but was the duty of the City
to make provision for a reasonable margin for the future,
as set out below:
but I am inclined to think that the city where it is
shown the size of Provo City, growing city, situated as it is, that it is not limited to the quantity of
water that it has a necessity for today. That is, in
other words, it would not hold that it had no beneficial use for a reasonable excess of water above
that because of the fact it is not only the right of
the city, but it is the duty of the city to make provision for a reasonable margin for future, but the
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important question in this case is what water y:Ju
have.
Mr. Thomas: We own.
The Court: You own, and how you got it. I
think, in other words, I am of the opinion you
have shown a necessity and beneficial use for the
quantity of water that you are claiming. Now, if
you own that water, if you have that water and
have the right to it, I am inclined to think by
proving that fact you have made a prima facie
case. I will listen to any suggestion you have
along that line. (R. 190)
Replying to the statement in the paragraph in the
center of page 10 of the Defendant's brief, it seems
obvious that the last sentence in paragraph 4 ( c) was
intended to make clear the fact that the power rights,
as well as the irrigation rights were owned by Provo
City even though the power rights had been used by
other parties.
With respect to the other matters set forth on page
10, the matters set forth on page 11 and the first paragraph on page 12 of the Defendants' brief, Provo City
feels that most of the arguments stated therein have
been covered in other parts of this brief in reply to what
the Defendants have termed "foundational facts", and
in Provo City's earlier brief.
The Defendants in the first paragraph on page 12
apparently take the position that the diametrically
opposite interpretation placed upon paragraph 4 ( c)
by the parties themselves is proof that this paragraph
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is ambiguous. If this were the case, the Court would
have to automatically assume in all cases that a decree
was ambiguous any time parties disagree concerning
its interpretation. This obviously is an untenable position.

POINT III
REPLY TO POINT TWO
The matters set forth in point two of the Defendants' brief down to the last paragraph on page 16 have
been substantially covered in previous portions of this
brief. The City will, however, comment on one or two
points.
It should be kept in mind that everything referred
to in this portion of Defendants' brief relates to reports,
testimony, and preliminary proceedings which took
place approximately three and one-half years before
the entry of the final decree, and that many substantial
changes were made subsequent to that time as a result
of additional evidence, stipulations, and arguments of
the parties. However, nothing is shown during this
period which confines the factory race water to power
use only. In fact the outline of proposed distribution
(R. 92 and 93), as pointed out earlier, concerns itself
only with water which was entirely put to consumptive
uses, and includes among those the water of the factory
race. It makes no provision whatever for non-consumptive power use water.
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Defendants infer that the 4 ( c) water was not used
for irrigation purposes because the acreage and duty
are not set out in the outline of proposed distribution
for the year 1917 ( R. 92 and 93) , and that the Provo
River Water Commissioner, T. F. Wentz, in one of
his statements, did not include in certain measurements
the waters delivered through the factory race for power
purposes (R. 110 A). However, other testimony shows
specifically that this water was used for irrigation purposes and that the stream, for the irrigation season, on
the factory race was a fixed amount throughout the
season because of the dual use for irrigation and power.
The other uses for irrigation varied during the season
in the amounts used between .June 20 and .July 20 and
the amounts used from .July 20 to September 1 of the
year. This would account for the necessity of the River
Commissioner to measure the quantities supplied to
the other irrigation users under the tentative decree on
the dates when their rights decreased, because it would
be necessary for him to regulate the several head gates
accordingly. However, inasmuch as the factory race
remained constant it would not be necessary to measure
that stream and re-regulate its diversion gates during
the season.
The testimony of Henry .J. W. Goddard, City
Water Master, wherein he was referring to the lands
irrigated under the several canals in the City, clearly
shows that the water from the factory race was used for
irrigation. His testimony in this respect was as follows:

(R. 177)
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Q. Now the Factory Race?
A. The Factory Race.
Q. What is the lot acreage water after it leaves
that race?

Mr. Jacob Evans: Object to that because it has
already been stated.
Mr. Thurman: You have given us this once.
Mr. Corfman: I think not in the same form.
Mr. Thurman: You gave us below the Factory
and above the Factory separately. It is confusing
our record a little.
Q. Now, taking the Factory Race, besides the
purpose of using the water for that race for irrigation, it is also used for power? (Italics ours.)

A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Goddard, in indicating how the different water
tickets or time notices were given to the irrigators under
the several canals throughout the City, testified as follows: (R. 180, 181 and 182)
Q. Forty years. Now, take the next stream or
next canal that you have jurisdiction over. Which
is the next one down from the East Union?
A. That would be the Factory Race would be
the first.
Q. How do you distribute the water under that
race?
A. That is given out on time written notice.
Q. Do you have--do you distribute water in
the Factory Race in any way different from the
manner you distribute from the East Union?
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A. Yes, little different, because they have a set
time for the whole season.
Q. Do I understand then that you have not a
fixed time for the whole season on the East
Union?

A. No sir, we cannot have it.
Further down on page 1085 and 1086: (R. 181 and
182)
Q. Now then the disposition of the water on the
Factory Race is in a more regular way than that,
I understand you to say?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is this one of the races to which you give the
farmer written notice (Italics ours.)

A. Yes, sir.

r

Q. Fixing their time from one season end to
the other?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The Factory Race is the race upon which
the power users are, is it not.
A. Yes, sir.
Also the testimony of the watermaster Swan at
page 735: (R. 169)
down with the Factory Race run and extending
as far south as 1st North Street. That is irrigated
from the Factory Race. (Italics ours.)
Further down on pages 735, 736 and 737: (R. 169,
170 and 171)
Q. Now, take your pointer and show the next
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canal that lies nearest the East Union Canal that
you have described?
A. The next canal is the Factory Race. It heads
near the same point as indicated at the East Union
Canal, below the tail race of the Provo Pressed
Brick Company's plant, towards the northwest
corner of the land that is marked on the plat,
Roger Farrar.
Q. That canal runs in a southerly direction?

A. Runs in a southerly direction to 5th North
Street in an irregular line and then follows down
the east side of 2nd West Street as far as the middle of the block between 4th and 5th South, then
it runs southeasterly to 5th South, one branch
there running East to 1st West and then in a
southeasterly direction across to the Smoot Mill
which is located in the southeastern part of Block
I, Plat A, then in a southerly direction down until
it reaches the lake.
Q. What land does it irrigate?

A. It irrigates the lands-the lands are irregular, it irrigates a number of blocks laying north of
Center Street and west of the canal. It irrigates
all of the tier, first tier to the west of the Factory
Race, with the exception on one block, Block 113,
in Plat A.

Q. Provo City?
A. Of Provo City.

Q. '¥hat other uses?
A. And to the southwest where it reaches the
south side of 5th South Street there is another
branch which does not go through the Smoot Mill,
which runs in a southerly direction and then turns
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in a southeasterly direction, crossing the other
branch. At the lower end of Academy Avenue
what is called the pasture lane, crossing over and
entering the First Ward pasture.
Q. Does it irrigate land there?

A. It frrigates land in the First Ward pasture
and also some of the lands lying to the west of the
First Ward pasture, and south of 6th South
Street.
Q. What other uses are the waters of the Factory Race put to aside from the irrigation which
you just described?

A. The waters of the Factory Race in conjunction with the waters of City Creek, and such
waters as are turned to the Dry Creek, Fort Field
and Little Dry Creek from the City race, pass
through the Provo Pressed Brick Company s
wheel which is just above the Factory Race. The
Factory Race is utilized for power by the Provo
Ice and Cold Storage Company, Hoover's Mill,
the Knights Woolen Mill, 'iV ard and Sons Mill
and the Smoot Lumber Company Mill.
In the center paragraph on page 17 of Defendants'
brief they assert that paragraph 4 (a) and 4 ( b) of the
decree awarded a full water right for all of Provo City's
irrigated land. There is nothing whatever in the record
to substantiate this. We have previously in this brief
pointed out that undoubtedly the land mentioned in
4 (a) and 4 ( b) represented only a part of the total
lands irrigated by Provo City's water rights. We have
pointed out also, that even if the Defendants were
correct in their contention, it would not be persuasive
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with respect to the award of the water in 4 ( c) because
the Court specifically indicated that it felt the City was
entitled to own water which was not assigned or attached
to any particular land. (R. 189 & 190). Here again,
it must be kept in mind, that the Court in Civil No.
2888 is determining the extent of water right which
had previously been acquired by the various parties
and which as a result of such previous ownership they
were entitled to have awarded to them in that action.
It is not as if they were establishing new rights which
had never been acquired previously, they were being
awarded those rights which they already owned. ( R.
192)

In the paragaph starting on page 17 and ending
at the top of page 18 of their brief, the Defendants
contend that the foundation of the whole decree was
the duty of water. This is not correct. The foundation
of the whole decree was the water rights already owned
by the various parties and which had been acquired
by them many years prior to the commencent of the
action, as the Court specifically stated in paragraph 45
of the Findings of Fact in Civil No. 2888. (R. 192)
Again, in the middle paragraph on page 18, the
Defendants refer to the ground described in paragraphs
4 (a) and 4 ( b) of the decree as being all of Provo
City's farm acreage and all of its City lots. There is
nothing in the decree to support this statement. It is
simply a gratuitous assumption on the part of the
Defendants. It should be noted by the Court, in Mr.
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Swan's testimony previously set out in this brief, that
the Factory Race watered outlying pasture lands and
continued on down clear to Utah Lake. (R. 169, 170
and 171).
The hearing (R. 142, 143, 144, and 145) which
is the subject of the Defendants' discussions at pages
18 and 19 of their brief appears to be nothing more
than a discussion between attorneys and the Court
with respect to someone's application to reopen the case
with reference to the duty of water assigned to certain
land, as is clearly shown in the closing remarks of the
Judge (center of R. 145) and simply shows that the
Court felt that the acre duty, which was the subject of
the motion, was already generous.
In the center paragraph on page 21 of the Defendants' brief, the comment is made by the Defendants
that Provo Pressed Brick Company was required to
return the water to the stream without substantial
diminution in quantity or any deterioration in quality
because of the fact that it was to be used by other parties
further down the stream. This is obviously the reason
for this restriction, as it was in the case of the award
to Utah Power and Light Company, (R. 162 and 167)
which was the only other award of Class A water for
purely power purposes. The point Provo City makes
by this is that if the 16.5 second feet of water awarded
in paragraph 4 ( c) of the decree had been intended for
purely power uses, the same restriction would have been
placed on it, because undoubtedly, irrigation rights in
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this water would have been acquired by someone downstream from the power uses, and these irrigation rights
would have been given the same protection as the ones
below the Utah Power and Light Plant and the Provo
Pressed Brick Company Plant.
At no place in the decree is there any indication
of the granting of any irrigation right in this water
downstream from the power uses if the position is taken
that irrigation rights in it were not awarded to Provo
City. This would be inconceivable in the light of the
needs for irrigation water below these power uses. The
only answer to this is that the 4 ( c) water was an irrigation right as well as a power right, both owned by
Provo City.
In their paragraph beginning at the bottom of page
21 and continuing on through the top of page 22 of their
brief, the Defendants try to explain the limitation to
the irrigation season of the use of the 16.5 second feet
of water in the Factory Race by stating that "paragraph 4 ( c) limited Provo City's power use to 16.5
second feet when in competition with the irrigation uses
in the lower reaches." ('Italics ours) What irrigation
uses of the Factory Race water in the lower reaches
could there possibly have been except irrigation use
by Provo City of this water. There is no indication in
the record of any irrigation award in the lower reaches
of the Factory Race, except to Provo City.
Additionally, it should be noted that the power
awards to Utah Power and Light Company and to
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Provo Pressed Brick Company, which were strictly
power uses, were not limited nor tied to the irrigation
season in any respect, but were simply awarded for the
full year. (R. 161, 162, 166 and 167)
The remainder of the material on page 22 of Defendants' brief was covered in Provo City's original
brief, and will not be dealt with further here.
The statements in the center paragraph on page
23 of Defendants' brief are dealt with earlier in this
brief.
Replying to the last paragraph on page 23 of
Defendants' brief which has been carried over onto
page 24, Provo City does in fact place great importance
on the statements in the second sentence of paragraph
4 ( c) in which the following statement appears in reference to the 16.5 second feet of water: "Which water
has heretofore been used for irrigation purposes by said
City". In the light of the fact that all of the awards
in the decree were based on previous use of the water
awarded, on the nature and extent of the use, and on
the ownership previously established by the parties,
and were awarded because of such earlier use and ownership, it would appear without question that this statement in the decree, supported by a corresponding statement in the Findings would be conclusive in establishing Provo City's irrigation rights in this water.
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POINT IV
REPLY TO POINT III
In reply to Point III of the Defendants' brief
both the State Engineer and the District Court, under'
the guise of interpreting the Decree, exceeded their
jurisdiction in that they both unjustifiably took into
consideratfion extra1*ous materials and actually readjudicated a right which had previously been adjudicated. This is contrary to law. (United States v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District in and for Utah
County, 121 U 1, 238 T. 2d 1132 (1951); East Bench
Irrigation Company v. State, 5 U 2d 235, 300 P 2d
603 (1956); and Orphir Creek Water Company v.
Orphir Hill Consol. Mining Company, 61 U 551, 216
p 490 (1923).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Provo City reiterates that the crux
of this case is the interpretation of paragraph 4 (c) of
the Provo River Decree, and that inasmuch as there
is no ambiguity in it, the Court should inquire no further,
but should make its decision upon the natural and ordinary meaning of the wording of the Decree.
In an attempt to get the Court to consider material
outside of the Decree in arriving at its interpretation,
the Defendants have not shown the existence of any
ambiguity in the Decree when read in the light of the
subject matter and the basis of the awards and the
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ordinary and natural meaning of the language used.
Instead they have primarily tried to create uncertainty
and ambiguity by the use of extraneous matters, which
this Court has previously ruled cannot be done. (Salt
Lake City vs. Salt Lake City Water and Electrical
Company, 54 U 10, 174 P 1134) The Defendants
attempt to show ambiguity in the Decree itself by pointing out that the award in paragraph 4 ( c) was treated
in a different way from those in 4 (a) and 4 (b), and
also because it was not worded the same as most other
parts of the Decree. This different treatment is not
only understandable, but is logical. It is the only award
of its kind (for both irrigation and power purposes
to the same owner) in the whole Decree, and required
a different treatment. In fact, that is why it was set
out in a separate paragraph by itself.
It is the City's contention that only as a last extreme
resort should reference be made to statements of witnesses and attorneys during the proceeding. Resort to
such material tends to result, in effect, in a retrying
of the case, and is particularly unreliable where each
party picks out and cites isolated portions of the testimony and statements which were most favorable to their
position, as was done in this case. In a case of this kind,
which involved thousands of pages of testimony and
other proceedings it would be an impossible task to
fairly locate and extract from the record everything
which would have any bearing on a particular part of
the decree. Even if this could be done it could only
tend to result in an attempt to retry the case and place
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on the evidence an interpretation different from that
arrived at by the trial judge. Anything of this kind
clearly should be avoided.
The natural and ordinary meaning of the wording
of the Provo River Decree, and of paragraph 4 ( c) of
that Decree, particularly when read in the light of the
subject matter and of the basis of the awards in the
Decree, is to the effect that Provo City had previously
used and acquired the 16.5 second feet of water in 4 ( c)
for irrigation purposes as well as power, and was
awarded this water for these dual purposes.
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